China’s concern regarding her food security is well known, and has manifested itself in many domains of influence. This concern is naturally shared at the highest levels of government, and has in the past led to intensive farming and soil depletion or even desertification. It would be relatively easy at this point to extrapolate this kind of behaviour—one that can appear relatively short-sighted but that, as with regard to the question of climate change, could be justified were it to accompany attempts to manage the crisis by investing in, planning and experimenting with alternative methods capable of doing away with these practices. As with a number of issues concerning Chinese governance, there is probably no alternative to ‘engaging with stakeholders’ and to believing their professed wish to take part in the definition and application of regulations; but as in other domains and in this one in particular, interfering with private concerns whose main goal is profitability or even survival renders the task of ‘normalizing’ Chinese practices extremely difficult. Although we should not forget that this is a country that is openly seeking to project an image of greater responsibility in its dealings with international organizations and institutions of global governance, fierce competition nonetheless raises the fearful prospect that Asia’s main actors will in future be even more difficult to ‘manage’ than China. Identifying the stakes at play and the results to be achieved by 2030 (see above) was an important step and confirms the importance of Asia as a new ‘centre of gravity’ in terms of fisheries and aquaculture; but responding to the urgency of the matter and creating effective mechanisms for verification and control—and perhaps even sanctions—continue to be key to resolving these critical questions of the coming decades.
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